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ABSTRACT: The quality of argumentation in parliamentary debates may play an important role in the 
evaluation of legislative decisions. In this contribution I will discuss shortcomings in the application of the 
pragma-dialectical argumentation theory for the analysis and evaluation of the argumentation in a 
parliamentary debate on the penalization of stalking. The case illustrates that institutional preconditions of a 
specific type of debate should be taken into account in order to be able to give an adequate analysis of these 
debates. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
There are various reasons to analyse discussions on legislation and to evaluate the 
acceptability of argumentation in the process of legislation. When, for instance, in a 
judicial decision the matter of the interpretation of a legal rule is raised, one or the other 
interpretation may be justified with an appeal to the arguments raised at the time of the 
legislative process. This may cause the party that does not agree with a certain 
interpretation to go into the arguments raised at the time. Not only the acceptability of the 
argumentation of the opponent, the acceptability of the argumentation put forward in 
favour of a certain interpretation too, may be may be the target of criticism (Plug, 2005). 
 Since the acceptability of the argumentation for important, influential   decisions 
such as legislative decisions is indicative of the quality of our democracy, this may be yet 
another reason to verify whether the legislative discussions meet certain standards of 
reasonableness (Steiner, Bächtiger et al, 2004). 
 The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory by van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1984) provides criteria to assess the quality of argumentation. In order to be able to 
apply these criteria in an institutional context such as the legislative process, it has first to 
be determined which context-related criteria, both general and specific, play a part in the 
evaluation of the justification of, in this particular case, legislative decisions. 
 This contribution aims to discuss several problems that may arise if a pragma-
dialectical analysis and evaluation of argumentation in the legislative process does not 
take sufficiently into account the specific context in which the argumentation has been 
put forward. 
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2.  THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL APPROACH IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS   
 
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical argumentation theory employs the 
model of a critical discussion for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. 
This theory regards argumentation as part of a critical exchange of ideas aimed at solving 
a difference of opinion. The theoretical model specifies the distinctive stages in the 
process of solving a difference of opinion as well as the relevant speech acts in this 
process. The rules for a critical discussion provide a useful tool to verify whether a 
speech act frustrates the solution of a dispute and, as such, should be treated as a fallacy. 
 In order to be able to adequately apply the pragma-dialectical tools in the analysis 
and evaluation of argumentation, the specific context in which the argumentation has 
been put forward has to be taken into account.1 As far as the heuristic function of the 
theoretical model is concerned, van Eemeren and Grootendorst point out that knowledge 
of textual genres as well as of formal and informal conventions in a certain institutional 
context may supplement the model for critical discussion when selecting elements 
relevant for the solution of a dispute. Knowledge of conventions pertaining to 
institutional contexts may, moreover, prove useful for the justification of an analytical 
reconstruction of an argumentative text or discussion (van Eemeren en Grootendorst 
2004: 111). 
 Law provides us with an institutional context in which the pragma-dialectical 
insights have been applied extensively. Feteris (1999) considers legal argumentation as a 
specific institutionalised form of argumentation and analyses, on the basis of the pragma-
dialectical model, both civil and criminal proceedings. Feteris and various other scholars 
demonstrate how the model of the critical discussion can be used to analyse and evaluate 
judicial decisions. 
 The institutional context in which legislative decisions are taken does show 
similarities with judicial contexts, for the analysis and evaluation of legislative 
discussions however, the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory is used significantly 
less frequently. In this respect Royakkers and van Klink (2000) are the exception to the 
rule. In their analysis and evaluation of the argumentation put forward in the proposition 
of a bill which penalizes stalking, they do make use of pragma-dialectics. A closer look at 
their approach reveals some of the complications which may come to light in the 
argumentative reality in a pragma-dialectical analysis of (part of) discussions and how 
these complications may influence the evaluation. In the following paragraph I will 
briefly outline the procedural background of the bill and the evaluation of the 
argumentation for it by Royakkers and van Klink in their article ‘Drogredenen in het 
parlementaire debat’ (‘fallacies in parliamentary debates’) (2000). 
 
3. FALLACIES IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE PENELIZATION OF STALKING  
 
In 1997 three MPs, Dittrich, Swildens-Rozendaal and Vos, introduce a bill aimed at 
adding to the Dutch Criminal Code a new article in which stalking will be punishable. 
                                                 
1 Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005a) emphasize that in view of the rhetorical dimension of strategic 
manoeuvring, it is all the more important to take the communicative context  into account when analysing 
and evaluating argumentative moves. This can be done by account for the type of argumentative activity in 
which these moves take place. 
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Before the bill is introduced the Minister of Justice makes it clear that she does not 
believe in this bill as she has her doubts as to its effectiveness. These doubts explain why 
the Minister did not submit the bill herself, as is common practice. On 31 August and 1 
September 1999 the bill is put forward and discussed in the Second Chamber (of the 
Dutch Parliament).2 On 14 September 1999 the bill is passed by acclamation. 
 In their article Royakkers and van Klink (2000) discuss ‘the most striking 
fallacies’ that have been committed by the bill’s initiators during the parliamentary 
debates in the Second Chamber. According to the authors it is important to expose 
fallacies in parliamentary debates since fallacies could have detrimental effects on public 
opinion. Royakkers and van Klink are of the opinion that there is no place for dubious 
discussion techniques in a reasonable solution of political differences of opinion, or, at 
least, that parliamentary debates should not be overrun by such techniques. They use the 
pragma-dialectical argumentation theory as a starting point for their search for fallacies in 
the legislative discussion on the penalization of stalking. In their evaluation of legislative 
debates, the authors limit themselves to three subjects that (could) give rise to differences 
of opinion: ‘the clearness of the notion of ‘personal privacy’, the effectiveness of the civil 
approach of stalking and the effectiveness of the suggested penalty clause. They observe 
different kinds of fallacies in discussions on these subjects. The first fallacy they 
distinguish is the ‘argument from authority’, the second is ‘the fallacy of withholding 
information’, the third is ‘the fallacy of misleading repetition’, the fourth is ‘hasty 
generalization’ and the ‘straw man’ is the fifth fallacy. 
 The authors believe that the quality of forming public opinion could be threatened 
by an excess of fallacies in parliamentary debates on bills and conclude that the quality of 
the current debate leaves much to be desired. Their critical evaluation is published after 
the bill has been passed by the Second Chamber but before the First Chamber’s debate on 
the bill on 16 May 2000. In the following paragraph I will discuss the reception of 
Royakkers and van Klink’s criticism in the First Chamber. 
 
4. THE PERCEPTION OF CRITICISM IN THE FIRST CHAMBER 
 
During the debates in the First Chamber a number of Members, among whom de Wolff 
(the Green Party), Holdijn (Reformed Party), Kohnstamm (Progressive Liberal 
Democrats), Witteveen (Dutch Labour Party) and Rosenthal (Conservative Liberal 
Democrats), state their views on the criticism as presented by Royakkers and van Klink. 
It is during the same debate that Dittrich, who, as one of the initiators of the bill has to 
defend the bill in the First Chamber, reacts to the criticism in Royakkers and van Klink’s 
article. The first contribution to the debate is from Rosenthal and he rejects the criticism 
on the argumentation of the bill’s initiators as follows. 
 
Mr Rosenthal (Conservative Liberal Democrats): The conservative faction, at this point, does not 
feel the need to support the (in the eyes of the conservative faction somewhat a-political) criticism 
of Royakkers and van Klink as published in NJB magazine, suggesting that the members who 
submitted the bill excessively resort to so-called fallacious arguments. Politics, we assumed, is 
rhetoric. Or so our colleague Witteveen taught me. Everyone has his own arguments, which are 
                                                 
2 The Dutch Parliament consists of two Houses, the Lower House, also known as the House of 
Representatives or the Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer) and the Upper House, also known as the Senate 
or the First Chamber (Eerste Kamer). 
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then labelled fallacious by others. The moment our colleague de Wolff speaks of ‘lethal etc’, I 
inevitably spot the genesis of a fallacy. This could keep us busy for any length of time. 
(Proceedings of the First Chamber, 16 May 2000) 
 
Rosenthal believes that the evaluative criteria employed by Royakkers and van Klink in 
their evaluation of legislative debates do not apply to politics. As far as he is concerned 
there would be no end to start revealing fallacies in politicians’ contributions to 
legislative discussions. Politicians have always resorted to rhetorical means which other 
may then label fallacious. According to Rosenthal it is, in other words, not entirely clear 
on what grounds one may conceive of a contribution in a political context as a fallacy. 
 Witteveen (Dutch Labour Party), to whom Rosenthal refers, is also of the opinion 
that the criteria employed by Royakkers and van Klink are not adequate for the 
evaluation of argumentation in legislative debates.3 From his contribution to the debate 
on the bill it becomes clear that he deploys different criteria in order to label discussion 
moves as fallacious. Exactly which criteria he does employ, however, remains unclear. 
 
Witteveen (Dutch Labour Party): Mister Speaker! My admiration for the bill and for those by 
whom it was submitted has grown in the course of the evening. In my opinion the questions were 
very adequately answered and I did not detect any fallacy at all. There is no doubt in my mind that 
van Klink and Royakkers, on the contrary, would be able to do so and would, furthermore, select 
fallacies from my words and from those of other debaters, if only because we often do use 
arguments from authority. This is, after all, part and parcel of political rhetoric, even though van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst might disapprove. 
(Proceedings of the First Chamber, 16 May 2000) 
 
Witteveen’s argument that one should not assess the use of an argument from authority in 
political (legislative) debates in the same way as one would in non-political discussions, 
is a case in point. He mistakenly assumes that van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-
dialectical approach always labels an argument from authority as fallacious. On the 
contrary, more than once they have argued that the use of an argument from authority 
should not be labelled a fallacy, an argumentum ad verecundiam, as a matter of course. 
Moreover, they indicate that the use of an argument from authority may even prove an 
effective argumentation technique (1992). 
 At the end of the debate in the First Chamber, it appears that Dittrich too is not at 
all convinced that the criticism of Royakkers and van Klink is justified. He puts forward 
the following objections. 
 
Mr Dittrich: It would very much like to give a moment’s thought to a number of remarks, made by 
almost all members, as to the article in NJB magazine regarding fallacies in parliamentary debates. 
(…) We do feel that they [the writers of the article] seem to have lost all sense of perspective in 
their approach to our bill. (…) We disagree with their main argument since parliamentary debates 
know different phases and different rounds. It all starts with a written phase which is followed by a 
verbal presentation in the Second Chamber. Then the bill is dealt with in written form by the First 
Chamber, followed by a debate. The debate in the Second Chamber is strikingly absent in the NJB 
article. Some arguments – fallacies – are selected from a certain phase and then criticized, yet our 
answers, during the debates for instance, are completely ignored (…). The idea of the article, 
having a closer look at fallacies, is, in our view, not suited for elongated discussions such as these. 
The book of Professor van Eemeren and the late Mr Grootendorst […] is meant to indicate which 
                                                 
3 In the past Witteveen published a number of books and articles on the use of rhetorical methods in 
legislative discussions (for instance, 1988). 
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arguments in a discussion have not been put forward correctly. However, especially if the 
discussions took place in phases, often repeating the same questions and answers, it is very hard to 
maintain that we witnessed the fallacy of misleading repetition. If you believe something and you 
are trying to answer questions using the strongest possible arguments, it is indeed very unpleasant 
to see someone label them as fallacies. […] Professor van Eemeren’s book is, nonetheless, an 
interesting read for politicians. In the political arena fallacies are used by many, wittingly or 
unwittingly. However, if you believe in a point of view and a number of people support you – 
Professor Groenhuijsen for instance – it is only to be expected that you quote scholars who support 
your views […]. It is not our task to set the stage for people who disagree with us. 
(Proceedings of the First Chamber, 16 May 2000) 
 
Dittrich wonders whether Royakker and van Klink’s approach is at all correct. In their 
evaluation they have (in Dittrich’s eyes mistakenly) disregarded certain argumentative 
contributions, thus ignoring procedural particularities of legislative debates. He believes 
that these particularities should be taken into account in the evaluation of certain debating 
techniques. As to the use of arguments from authority, he not only doubts their fallacious 
nature but also questions the scope of the argumentative obligations on the part of the 
standpoint’s protagonist. 
 
5. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE APPLICATION OF PRAGMA-DIALECTICS  
 
From these reactions it becomes apparent that politicians in the First Chamber reject 
Royakkers and van Klink’s criticism on a number of grounds. In the first place, there are 
doubts as to the fallacious nature of a certain contribution in the political context of a 
legislative debate. Secondly, there are doubts as to the acceptability of Royakkers and van 
Klink’s use of pragma-dialectics in their analysis and evaluation of the initiators’ 
argumentation.  
 I will set out to assess these doubts on the basis of one of the subjects of 
discussion at which Royakkers and van Klink’s criticism is aimed: the civil approach to 
the problem of stalking. The initiators of the bill that proposes to penalize stalking are 
motivated by the fact that civil measures such as restraining orders are supposedly not 
effective. There are, however, no reliable quantitative data to support this point of view, 
according to Royakkers and van Klink. It is, in their view, therefore unacceptable that the 
initiators of the bill have stated repeatedly that ‘restraining orders do not have the desired 
effect’. The authors quote the following claims: 
 
‘Civil actions, such as restraining orders supported by penalties, often do not have the desired 
result. Too often stalkers couldn’t care less about civil actions and violate with impunity the 
restraining order.’ 
(Explanatory memorandum, a.w., pg. 6-7, conference year 1997-1998) 
 
‘Restraining orders are often violated. Penalties are of course imposed, but if the stalker is without 
any means to speak of, there is not much to be gained.’  
(Trouw, 22 March 1997) 
 
‘The poor effect of civil restraining orders is widely known.’  
(Memorandum on the report, 22 March 1999) 
 
Royakkers and van Klink claim that repeating the same standpoint over and again 
strongly suggests that this point of view is true and that there is the risk of Members of 
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Parliament, but scholars as well, to accept this standpoint unquestioningly. In the authors’ 
view the initiators of the bill in this way commit a fallacy which could be labelled 
‘misleading repetition’ and which finds its origins in the stylistic device called ‘repetitio’ 
in classical rhetoric. By repeating the same standpoint over and over again it is suggested, 
without any supportive evidence, that this standpoint is the truth.  
 Since Royakkers and van Klink, in their analysis, work from pragma-dialectical 
starting point, it is from that perspective that it has to be assessed whether repeatedly 
putting forward the same standpoint is in itself fallacious. 
 In order to be able to evaluate contributions to a discussion from a pragma-
dialectical perspective and to establish whether these contributions are sound or 
fallacious, a reconstruction must first be made of the elements that may be considered a 
part of a critical discussion. This means that an analytical overview will have to be made 
of all parts of the legislative debate relevant to the solution of the difference of opinion. 
 Before answering the question whether the aforementioned quotes are indeed part 
of a critical discussion, it needs to be said that these quotes should not be reconstructed as 
standpoints, as Royakkers and van Klink would have it, but as arguments. The quoted 
passages, in the discussion, after all function as support for the standpoint that concerns 
the penalization of stalking. When reconstructing the discussion, the argument will, 
however, be included only once. Repetitions of the same argument are considered 
irrelevant for the solution of a difference of opinion and are therefore ignored (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2000: 111, 112). If the initiators’ repetitive arguments are 
irrelevant and therefore not detrimental to the solution of the dispute, no discussion rule 
has been violated and it is therefore impossible to label the repetition of the same 
argument as fallacious.  
 It is, however, not quite clear whether the contributions as quoted should be 
reconstructed as arguments put forward in one and the same discussion. It is, in other 
words, debatable whether a legislative discussion should be considered as one critical 
discussion. The following conditions as formulated by van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
(2005b) may be of use in answering the question whether two or more argumentative 
texts or discussions should be considered as part of one and the same critical discussion.4
 
1) All pieces of argumentative discourse are aimed at resolving the same difference 
of opinion. 
2) All pieces of argumentative discourse have the same procedural  starting points. 
3) All pieces of argumentative discourse have the same material starting points 
(except for those that are at issue). 
4) The parties involved assume the same positions and the same discussion roles in 
all pieces of argumentative discourse. 
 
On the surface, all argumentative contributions that are brought forward in a legislative 
procedure seem to be aimed at solving a difference of opinion on the desirability of a bill. 
A global outline of the Dutch legislative procedure, for instance, demonstrates, however, 
that legislative debates are much more complex than that. A bill is first send to the 
                                                 
4 These conditions are presented in an article on inconsistencies. In the case van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
use to demonstrate how the criteria could be applied, the MP Dittrich coincidentally plays a central role as 
well. 
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Council of State whose task it is to give a critical review of the judicial viability of the 
proposed law. The bill together with the advice of the Council of State are then presented 
to the Queen who, in her turn, puts forward the bill together with a Royal message to the 
Second Chamber. Next the bill is discussed in one of the Second Chamber’s standing 
committees. These debates are then reported by committees. This report is to say that the 
committee is of the opinion that the bill is ready for a plenary discussion. The bill’s 
initiators, finally, react to this report by drawing up a memorandum. 
Then the moment has come for the Members of Parliament who initiated the bill 
to defend it during a plenary session of the Second Chamber. It is the privilege of the 
Second Chamber as co-legislator to change bills by passing amendments. The Members 
of Parliament then take a vote on the bill and on the amendments, if so desired after a 
discussion. If a bill has been passed by the Second Chamber, it is submitted to the First 
Chamber. 
On the basis of two of the conditions that are developed by van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser, this global representation of the legislative procedure (in the Netherlands) 
demonstrates that not all debates held in the course of the legislative procedure should be 
considered as part of one and the same critical discussion. After all, in the course of the 
legislative process different standpoints are brought under discussion (condition 1) and, 
the parties involved assume not the same positions and the same discussion roles in all 
pieces of argumentative discourse (condition 4).5
This implies that the statements in the quotes should be treated as arguments put 
forward in different discussions. The argument in the quote that is part of the Explanatory 
Memorandum is put forward by the initiators of the bill in support of the standpoint ‘that 
the bill has been sufficiently prepared for a plenary discussion in the Second Chamber’. 
In doing so, they anticipate possible doubts on the part of members of the Second 
Chamber’s standing committee. The argument in the quotation from the newpaper Trouw, 
is put forward by the initiators to convince the public (the readers of the newspaper) that 
‘a bill to penalise stalking is desirable’. The argument in the third quote, found in the 
Memorandum on the Report, is put forward by the initiators to justify the standpoint that 
‘there are no doubts concerning the bill that may preclude a plenary discussion’. In this 
way they anticipate possible doubts from Members of the Second Chamber with respect 
to the preparedness of the bill for a plenary session. 
 The arguments that are quoted, therefore, should not be considered as parts of one 
and the same critical discussion. But even if they were, it remains unclear precisely which 
discussion rule would have been violated. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
On the basis of a pragma-dialectical evaluation of the argumentation during 
parliamentary debates on a bill which proposes to penalize stalking, Royakkers and van 
Klink set out to demonstrate that ‘a greater awareness and knowledge of (the use of) 
fallacies in the legislative process would benefit public opinion and by that legislation 
itself’. Since it was only to be expected that Members of the First Chamber would 
applaud the promotion of the quality of legislation, it was all the more surprising that they 
                                                 
5  Waaldijk (1987, 1994), too, indicates that legislative procedures involve various discussions between 
different discussants. 
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did not wish to include in their judgement of the bill the fallacies which were observed by 
Royakkers and van Klink. 
A closer analysis of the criticism concerning the legislative debate on this bill 
reveals that a number of problems occurred in the application of pragma-dialectical 
insights. The discussants’ contributions labelled fallacious have not been systematically 
held up to the pragma-dialectical discussion rules which makes it difficult to understand 
exactly why they are labelled fallacious. Moreover, the analysis of the legislative debate 
does not take into account the characteristics of the institutional context in which the said 
argumentation was put forward: the authors erroneously consider all argumentative 
contributions of the bill’s initiators as part of one and the same discussion. These 
shortcomings in the pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of contributions to the 
legislative discussion in the Second Chamber, may very well explain why the criticism on 
the discussants’ contributions was ignored in the First Chamber. Shortcomings as 
demonstrated in the case on stalking make it easier to push aside criticism on 
contributions to legislative discussions that from another (theoretical) perspective could 
have been justified, or to wrongfully conclude that the model for a critical discussion is 
unfit for the analysis and evaluation of legislative discussions. 
 
link to commentary
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